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Abstract
Prevailing user authentication schemes on smartphones
rely on explicit user interaction, where a user types in a
passcode or presents a biometric cue such as face, finger-
print, or iris. In addition to being cumbersome and ob-
trusive to the users, such authentication mechanisms pose
security and privacy concerns. Passive authentication sys-
tems can tackle these challenges by frequently and unobtru-
sively monitoring the user’s interaction with the device. In
this paper, we propose a Siamese Long Short-Term Mem-
ory network architecture for passive authentication, where
users can be verified without requiring any explicit authen-
tication step. We acquired a dataset comprising of mea-
surements from 30 smartphone sensor modalities for 37
users. We evaluate our approach on 8 dominant modali-
ties, namely, keystroke dynamics, GPS location, accelerom-
eter, gyroscope, magnetometer, linear accelerometer, grav-
ity, and rotation sensors. Experimental results find that,
within 3 seconds, a genuine user can be correctly verified
97.15% of the time at a false accept rate of 0.1%.
1. Introduction
The Digital Age has ushered in a large number of de-
vices that store and generate information. Among these de-
vices, smartphones are the most widely used [28]. An in-
teresting phenomenon has been observed in the smartphone
age, where users appreciate the convenience of services at
their fingertips and implicitly store more and more valuable
and private data, e.g., banking and payment details, health
records, etc. This has inadvertently sparked a community of
hackers that dedicate their time and effort to gain access to
smartphones in order to steal sensitive data [30]. Therefore,
securing access to mobile devices by authenticating users is
∗Smartphones are multi-purpose mobile computing devices with strong
hardware capabilities and extensive mobile operating systems, facilitating
wide internet and multimedia functionalities [37].
Figure 1: Authentication on smartphones by exploiting sen-
sorial data has become an active field of research due to the
growing number of available sensors in smartphones.
of utmost importance.
Current authentication schemes on mobile platforms re-
quire explicit user interaction with the device, referred to
as explicit authentication, in order to gain access to it. The
entry point for device access is typically a passcode or a
biometric cue such as face, fingerprints or iris [4]. Pass-
words and PINs have long been viewed as the pinnacle
of securing information and controlling access to mobile
devices. However, these knowledge-based authentication
schemes are prone to social engineering hacks, guessing
and over-the-shoulder attacks [11]. With recent advances in
technology, smartphones are getting better at authenticating
users by learning their biological traits, such as face, finger-
print, or iris, which are believed to be unique to individu-
als [19]. Since these traits are innate to an individual, they
are regarded as more reliable than knowledge-based authen-
tication schemes. On the downside, biometric authentica-
tion raises privacy concerns related to collecting biomet-
ric data. In addition, spoof attacks at the biometric sensor
level [31], and possible theft of biometric templates stored
inside the device, are among the growing concerns related
to biometric-based authentication.
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Table 1: Explicit vs. Passive Smartphone Authentication.
Explicit Authentication Passive Authentication
Verification User explicitly provides cre-
dentials (password, PIN) or
a biometric trait
User patterns (keystroke dy-
namics, touch gestures) are
unobtrusively collected
Enrollment Multiple samples of the bio-
metric traits are required
‘Template’ generated from
user patterns
Advantages Fast and accurate Seamless and non-intrusive
Although the use of explicit authentication schemes is
widespread, they are both cumbersome and obtrusive as the
user needs to actively focus on the authentication step be-
fore utilizing the device. For instance, an average user un-
locks their phone around 80 times a day [7], which can be
a source of frustration even for the most avid of users. It is
also estimated that, on average, a smartphone user spends
over 4 hours per day on their device [15]. Unsurprisingly,
more and more users prefer to set simple and weak pass-
words, increase the inactive period for lock-out time, or
disable the authentication step completely [27], [34]. In
addition, PIN codes, passwords, and biometric scans are
well-suited for one-time authentication but are not effective
in detecting intrusion after successful authentication by the
genuine user when unlocking the phone. Passive authenti-
cation systems tackle these challenges by providing an ad-
ditional layer of security by frequently and unobtrusively
monitoring the user’s interaction with the device. In this
paper, we propose a passive user authentication scheme for
smartphones where users are not required to participate in
any explicit authentication step. A brief summary of explicit
and passive smartphone authentication methods is given in
Table 1.
The first and foremost difficulty in designing user au-
thentication schemes for smartphones lies in gathering data
from the wide array of sensors available in a smartphone,
as well as from a variety of users. Smartphone users today
are much more sensitive to their privacy and more aware of
spywares, which may avert potential users from providing
their data. In this paper, we acquired a dataset comprising
of measurements from 30 sensor modalities for 37 users.
Besides data collection, a major challenge in designing
a robust passive authentication system for smartphones in-
volves extracting robust features from noisy1 data. In ad-
dition, the robustness and accuracy of the authentication
scheme needs to be thoroughly evaluated and inference
should be performed in real-time. On average, a smartphone
user’s session lasts for 72 seconds [25] and, therefore, the
time required to authenticate the user should be as small as
possible. It merely takes around 1.2 and 0.91 seconds to un-
lock an iPhone using FaceID and TouchID, respectively [1].
We propose a Siamese Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) architecture for extracting deep temporal features
1Smartphone sensors are prone to provide time-variant sources of noise
leading to inaccurate measurements [16].
from the data corresponding to a number of passive sensors
in smartphones for user authentication. We explore various
operational modes and scenarios along with the correspond-
ing authentication performance of the proposed method.
Concisely, the contributions of the paper are as follows:
• Proposed a passive user authentication method based
on keystroke dynamics, GPS location, accelerometer,
gyroscope, magnetometer, linear accelerometer, grav-
ity, and rotation modalities that can unobtrusively ver-
ify a genuine user with 97.15% TAR at 0.1% FAR
within 3 seconds.
• Acquired a dataset comprising of measurements from
30 different smartphone sensors for 37 users around
the world. An Android application was designed to
log data unobtrusively from the users’ smartphones.
• Analyzed changes in accuracy when (1) multiple
modalities are fused, and (2) authentication time is var-
ied. Increasing the number of fused modalities boosts
the accuracy, whereas the TAR at 0.1% FAR drops
from 99.80% to 97.15% for authentication times of 5
and 3 seconds, respectively.
2. Related Work
2.1. Passive Smartphone Authentication
Currently, there are around 2.5 billion active smartphone
users in the world [35]. With this increasing number, accu-
rate, fast and robust authentication on smartphones has be-
come an active area of research. Pioneering work on passive
smartphone authentication was based on touchscreen anal-
ysis [12], [22]. Frank et al. proposed a classification frame-
work, namely Touchalytics, and achieved an EER of 4%
on a dataset comprising of 41 users using touchscreen in-
put data. An obvious limitation of touchscreen recognition
for passive authentication is the requirement of substantial
explicit input from the user.
Smartphones today are shipped with an array of sensors
(see Figure 1). A topic of increasing number of studies has
focused on passive smartphone authentication via motion
sensors. In [24], the authors proposed a continuous motion-
based authentication system using data from accelerometer
and gyroscope sensors. They obtained an EER of 18.2%,
an error rate not suitable for security requirements.
2.2. Multimodal Biometric Systems
Most of the passive authentication studies have focused
on a single sensing modality for authentication. Authenti-
cating a user on their smartphone based on a single biomet-
ric modality becomes very challenging when the authen-
tication time window is short. In addition, given the task
the user is engaged in, the amount of data and the avail-
ability of different sensor modalities fluctuates. A robust
Table 2: A few related work on passive smartphone authentication.
Study Modality Dataset Statistics Classifier Accuracy Auth. Time*
HMOG [33] Movement, tap, keys 100 users, 24 sessions† Scaled Euclidean EER 7.16% 60-120 seconds
Hold and Sign [6] Movement, signature 30 users† Multilayer Perceptron 95% TAR @ FAR = 3.1% 235 seconds
Touchalytics [13] Touch gestures 41 users† kNN, SVM EER 3.0% 11-43 seconds
Mahbub et al. [23] Movement and others 48 users for 2 months Hidden Markov Model Accuracy 96.6% N/A
Fridman et al. [14] Stylometry, app & web
usage, GPS
200 users for 5 months SVM, n-gram EER 5.0% 60 seconds
This study 8 modalities in Table 3 37 users for 15 days Siamese LSTM 97.15% TAR @ FAR=0.1% 3 seconds
TAR = true accept rate; FAR = false accept rate; EER = equal error rate
† No time span available for this study
* Time required before authentication
passive authentication scheme must be able to adapt to the
high intra-user variability observed in human-smartphone
interaction. Sitova et al. introduced a multimodal approach
to passive smartphone authentication via accelerometer, gy-
roscope, and touch-screen observations [33]. Using a one-
class SVM classifier, an EER of 7.16% was achieved; how-
ever, the authors deferred real-world scenarios, such as in-
vestigating authentication accuracy when the user is not en-
gaged in typing, to future work. Niinuma et al. explored
a continuous authentication scheme using the user’s face
and color of clothing for verification using a webcam [26].
In [10], the authors explored a passive authentication sys-
tem for smartphones using face recognition. However, un-
obtrusively acquiring face images may be invasive to the
user’s privacy. Using a Siamese convolution neural net-
work, Centono et al. showed a 97.8% accuracy in verify-
ing the genuine user [8] using accelerometer, gyroscope,
and magnetometer sensor modalities. However, the study
does not consider the temporal dependence between sam-
ples. DeepAuth, on the other hand, used a LSTM architec-
ture to classify a genuine/impostor user via accelerometer,
gyroscope, and magnetometer samples [2]. However, they
considered a small dataset where each user’s session lasts
for only 10-13 minutes.
Fusing decisions from multiple modalities to authenti-
cate the user has been demonstrated to be very useful [32].
The majority of multimodal biometric systems fuse classi-
fiers at the score level based on min, max, or sum rules [21].
In the proposed approach, we adopt the sum of scores fu-
sion technique, which has been shown to perform well in
multimodal biometric systems compared to other fusion
schemes [18].
Limited studies on passive smartphone authentication
have utilized multimodal biometric systems but, to the best
of our knowledge, they have (1) all considered a small pool
of modalities, (2) not evaluated the temporal performance
of intrusion detection, and (3) not considered the tempo-
ral dependence of features across modalities. In this study,
we propose a Siamese LSTM network to address temporal
dependencies. A brief list of related work on passive smart-
phone authentication is given in Table 2.
3. System Overview
In the off-line phase, an authentication model is trained
via the proposed methodology for each modality. During
deployment, the incoming data from the smartphone sensor
modalities are continuously monitored. If the incoming data
successfully passes the authentication criteria, a decision is
made that the current user is indeed the legitimate owner of
the devices. Otherwise, the system locks out the user from
the device and offers an explicit authentication method such
as a password, or biometrics such as fingerprint scans.
4. Dataset
The dataset used in this work consists of measurements
from 30 sensors (see Table 8 for all 30 modalities), currently
present in most commonly used smartphones (see Table 7),
for 37 users. Data for each user was collected over a period
of 15 days. Users that participated in the data collection
process were primarily students from universities, across
different countries, who are also regular smartphone users2.
Dataset statistics are given in Table 4.
An Android application3 was built that passively ac-
quired data from the sensors (see Figure 6). This applica-
tion automatically turns on whenever the smartphone boots
up and continuously runs in the background while passively
recording sensor data. In order to collect keystroke dynam-
ics, we also built a custom soft-keyboard, installable from
the data collection application.
To the best our knowledge, our dataset is unique due to
(i) its rich sensor space (30 different sensors), and (ii) the
2The users were contacted by the authors and a consent form along with
the link to the data collection application was sent.
3[URL ommited for double-blind review]
Table 3: The eight dominant sensor modalities considered
in our study. All the 30 modalities collected can be found
in Table 8.
Keystroke Dynamics Key hold time, finger area and finger pressure
GPS Location User’s GPS location (latitude, longitude)
Accelerometer Smartphone’s acceleration in X, Y, Z plane
Gyroscope Gesture Rate of rotation of the device in X, Y, and Z planes
Magnetometer Earth’s magnetic field in X, Y, and Z planes
Gravity Sensor Direction and magnitude of gravity
Linear Acceleration Linear acceleration in X, Y, and Z planes
Rotation Sensor Device’s rotation in X, Y, and Z planes
Table 4: Dataset Statistics. A record is a measurement for
a sensor modality. Users that participated in the study are
primarily students located in different regions of the world,
including USA, India, Turkey, Brazil, and Dominican Re-
public.
No. of users 37
Data collection duration 15 days
No. of sensor modalities 30
Total number of records 6.7M
Average number of records per user 180K
Male to Female Ratio (%) 57/43
Age Range (years) 18 - 56
manner in which data was acquired keeping the real-world
scenario in mind. First, no user interaction with the data col-
lection application is required, thereby enabling the users to
use their smartphones as they generally would in their ev-
eryday lives. In order to simulate real world performance,
data from users were collected from their own personal de-
vices with no restrictions placed on the usage patterns, the
Android device, or the Android OS version. Data from the
modalities were acquired continuously, even when the user
is not actively interacting with their smartphone.
In this study, we evaluate authentication performance of
our proposed method on eight modalities (see Table 3), (i)
keystroke dynamics, (ii) GPS location, and (iii) accelerom-
eter, (iv) gyroscope, (v) magnetometer, (vi) linear accelera-
tion, (vii) gravity, and (viii) rotation. We chose these modal-
ities due to their popularity in literature [3], [33], [14], and
because these sensors are available in all smartphones. In
addition, among all the 30 modalities, measurements from
these sensors are most abundant and distinctive.
Keystroke Dynamics By modeling user’s typing rhythms
and mannerisms, can be used for authenticating smartphone
users. We record the finger pressure, finger area, and hold
time whenever a user types a character on their smart-
phone (similar to [3]). The exact characters typed are not
logged and therefore, the keystroke patterns collected are
non-invasive in nature.
GPS Location For every user in the dataset, a pair of lat-
itude and longitude coordinates is recorded whenever the
device was moved. Location is considered as a measure of
an individual’s characteristic and, therefore, we hypothesize
that distinguishable patterns can be found in a user’s every-
day location.
Movement We evaluate the authentication performance
for all the six movement sensors in our dataset: accelerome-
ter, gyroscope, magnetometer, linear accelerometer, gravity,
and rotation. Measurements are recording in three axes, X ,
Y , and Z, for all six sensors. The sampling rate for all six
sensor data stream is 1 Hz, i.e. one measurement per second.
In our dataset, intra-user chronological gaps in measure-
ments exists to the high-variability in user’s behavior, for in-
stance, they may switch off their smartphone, or the phone
may shut off due to battery drain. Even though these intra-
user variations in the dataset pose additional challenges, it
also better simulates real-world scenarios where such dis-
crepancies cannot be avoided.
5. Methodology
As shown in Figure 1, smartphones today are shipped
with an array of sensors including global positioning sys-
tem (GPS), accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer, and
others. In this paper, our goal is to utilize data from these
modalities in order to verify whether the genuine owner of
the device is logged in. There are two main passive smart-
phone authentication model training strategies, namely, on-
line and off-line. On-line approach trains an authentication
model using samples pertaining to the smartphone user for a
certain period of time before deploying the model. A major
limitation to on-line approach involves training an individ-
ual model for each user. As a consequence, it is challeng-
ing to accurately evaluate the overall authentication perfor-
mance across all the users due to high variance. In addition,
the required amount of data, the duration of data collection
before model deployment, and privacy concerns of storing
the training data are ongoing challenges.
Off-line approaches, on the other hand, train a common
authentication model that learns salient representations for
individual modalities. In this approach, the same trained
model is deployed when users install the application. More-
over, the users can avail of the authentication mechanism
immediately after the installation of the application. For
these reasons, we propose an off-line learning strategy for
passive smartphone authentication. In particular, for each of
the eight modalities, we train a Siamese LSTM network to
learn deep temporal features. Samples from users are trans-
formed into an embedding space learned by the Siamese
network. Therefore, during deployment, only the features
extracted from the incoming data are required for authen-
tication, thereby, eliminating the need to store private data
on the device. The proposed method is comprised of three
modules: (1) data sampling, (2) preprocessing, and (3)
Siamese LSTM. Figure 2 outlines the overall architecture
of the proposed method.
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Figure 2: Architecture of the proposed model. Here, {Xi, Xj} are input segment pairs, yij is the label, and fθ(·) and dθ
denote the embedding and distance function, respectively. The parameters of the Siamese LSTM network are denoted by θ.
Sampling Module Suppose that we extract a D-
dimensional data sample for a given sensor modality (for
instance, accelerometer has data in 3 axes, namely X , Y ,
and Z). The number of samples for each user can vary, and
our dataset is comprised of chronologically irregular mea-
surements for the same user due to various reasons such as
their phones being switched off. Therefore, we segment the
data by moving a window of fixed size T (authentication
time window) over the sequential data with a pre-defined
shift of Tshift and build overlapping fixed-sized segments.
Hence, for each user, we have a set of D × T segments.
These segments are then passed to the preprocessing mod-
ule.
Preprocessing Module The outputs of the sampling
module contain measurements from a modality in their orig-
inal domain, namely the time domain. The frequency do-
main can handle and remove noise, while also retaining
the discriminating patterns in the data within sequential
data [29]. We map measurements from the time domain to
frequency domain only for the movement sensors, i.e. ac-
celerometer, gyroscope, magnetometer, linear accelerome-
ter, gravity, and rotation. Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) [9]
is utilized to convert time domain signals on each feature
dimension to frequency domain signals. The output of the
FFT vectors are concatenated with samples in the time do-
main so that we can utilize information from both the do-
mains.
Siamese LSTM Our goal is to obtain highly discrimina-
tive features for each modality that can distinguish sam-
ples from genuine and impostor users. In other words, we
would like to learn information-rich transformation of the
data from modalities into an embedding space that can pre-
serve distance relation between training samples. Suppose
we are given a pair of input samples, {Xi, Xj}. Let yij be
a label, such that, yij = 0, if Xi and Xj belong to the same
user, and yij = 1, otherwise. Our objective is to map input
samples to an embedding space where two samples from
the same user are closer together and two samples from dif-
ferent users are far apart. A Siamese network architecture,
which is a neural network architecture comprising of two
identical sub-networks, is well-suited for such verification
tasks [5], [36]. In this manner, relationship between two in-
put samples can be learned. In a Siamese network, weights
between the two sub-networks are shared and the weights
are updated based on the label, yij .
A Siamese Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) was
previously proposed for passive smartphone authentica-
tion [8]; however, CNNs are not well-suited to capture the
temporal dependence within samples. We leverage Long
Short-Term Memory (LSTM) [17] as our Siamese archi-
tecture to model patterns in users’ data. LSTM, a vari-
ant of Recurrent Neural Networks (RNN), is designed for
classifying, processing and making predictions on time se-
ries data. In our approach, we stack two LSTMs in order
to learn hierarchical representation of the time series data.
The first LSTM outputs a sequence of vectors, h11, . . . , h
1
T
which are then fed as input to the second LSTM. The last
hidden state, h2T , of the second LSTM represents the final
non-linear embedding, denoted by fθ(·), where θ represents
the parameters of the Siamese LSTM network. This hierar-
chy of hidden layers allows for more salient representation
of the time-series data. We denote the embedding size of
both LSTMs as C.
In order to train the Siamese LSTM network, we define
a pairwise contrastive loss function. For a given pair of in-
put samples, the Euclidean distance between the two output
Table 5: Authentication performance of the 8 modalities. Across 5 folds, the mean and std. dev. of the TARs at 1.0% and
0.1% FAR are given. The best performing method is highlighted in light gray.
Modality Proposed Siamese LSTM Siamese CNN [8] LSTM [2] Euclidean Distance
1.0% FAR 0.1% FAR 1.0% FAR 0.1% FAR 1.0% FAR 0.1% FAR 1.0% FAR 0.1% FAR
Keystroke Dynamics 81.61 ± 13.65 58.71 ± 14.61 71.12 ± 15.67 43.87 ± 11.39 59.87 ± 18.82 26.73 ± 16.75 12.11 ± 7.60 8.20 ± 7.60
GPS 78.34 ± 4.76 52.21 ± 5.76 63.23 ± 10.82 39.23 ± 8.26 51.87 ± 9.97 21.42 ± 7.76 21.32 ± 1.32 12.76 ± 1.65
Accelerometer 74.56 ± 5.64 37.74 ± 6.67 67.28 ± 6.61 35.98 ± 7.33 64.83 ± 3.73 23.11 ± 3.82 13.06 ± 1.87 8.01 ± 0.81
Gyroscope 44.15 ± 7.53 15.18 ± 3.50 28.14 ± 7.69 11.33 ± 2.21 36.68 ± 7.43 8.89 ± 2.39 8.15 ± 1.23 6.54 ± 0.81
Magnetometer 74.15 ± 7.52 46.19 ± 8.83 60.91 ± 9.07 32.21 ± 6.87 26.33 ± 9.26 10.26 ± 8.33 18.85 ± 5.15 16.51 ± 5.88
Linear Accelerometer 50.19 ± 14.86 28.39 ± 16.20 46.35 ± 17.62 27.97 ± 18.74 29.89 ± 9.54 11.53 ± 6.78 8.91 ± 1.38 7.66 ± 0.95
Gravity 69.95 ± 4.35 32.24 ± 2.49 61.87 ± 7.95 31.92 ± 4.32 52.43 ± 5.64 32.12 ± 4.14 18.07 ± 5.41 10.98 ± 3.36
Rotation 74.85 ± 4.78 41.52 ± 3.02 61.91 ± 4.14 30.08 ± 1.29 56.75 ± 4.86 35.21 ± 3.98 17.96 ± 5.6 13.33 ± 3.72
feature vectors from the two sub-networks are fed to the
contrastive loss function. This loss function regulates large
or small distances depending on the label associated with
the pair of samples, yij . In this manner, we ensure that the
Euclidean distance between the pairs, dθ(Xi, Xj), where,
dθ(Xi, Xj) = ||fθ(Xi)− fθ(Xj)||2,
is small for genuine pairs and large for impostor pairs. The
contrastive loss function is defined as [36]:
`θ = Σ
N
i,j=1Lθ(Xi, Xj , yij), where
Lθ = (1− yij)1
2
(dθ)
2 + (yij)
1
2
{max(0, α− dθ)}2
where, α > 0 is called the margin.
6. Experimental Results
The contrastive loss function is optimized using
Adam [20] optimizer. The embedding size is fixed at 16.
Segment shift is set to Tshift = 1 for all the experiments.
Training details can be found in Appendix C.
6.1. Individual Modality Performance
Since a separate Siamese LSTM model is trained for
each modality, we first evaluate the authentication perfor-
mance of each individual modality. We perform 5-fold
cross-validation such that each fold comprises of 29 users
for training and 8 users for testing. The proposed method
is trained and tested on 20-second segments (T = 20). In
order to train and evaluate our model, pairs of segment sam-
ples are generated. Genuine pairs are all possible pairs of
segments from the same user. A sample from a user is
paired with another user’s segment randomly to constitute
an impostor pair. On average, each user has around 180,000
genuine pairs and the same number of impostor pairs across
all the modalities.
In Table 5, authentication performance of the proposed
method is compared with three baselines, (1) Siamese CNN
proposed by Centeno et al. [8], (2) a single LSTM network
proposed by Amini et al. [2], and (3) Euclidean distance
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Figure 3: Average TAR at 0.1% FAR on fusing all possi-
ble subsets of modalities. Increasing the number of fused
modalities boosts the overall accuracy up to 5 modalities.
Modalities TAR (%) @ 0.1% FAR
To
p-
3 Acc + Grv + Gyr + Key + Lin + Mag + GPS 99.92 ± 0.07
Acc + Grv + Gyr + Lin + Mag + Rot + GPS 99.96 ± 0.02
All 99.98 ± 0.01
W
or
st
-3 Gyr + Key 50.94 ± 29.05
Key + Lin 55.11 ± 31.43
Gyr + Lin 48.25 ± 4.13
Table 6: Top-3 best and worst-3 performing subsets of sens-
ing modalities across 5 folds4.
classifier. The proposed Siamese LSTM network outper-
forms Siamese CNN due to LSTM’s capability of capturing
temporal dependencies. In addition, Siamese architectures
are better suited for preserving distances between pairs of
input samples. Thus, the proposed architecture has a bet-
ter authentication performance than a single LSTM. Since
Euclidean distance is used in the proposed method, we also
investigate the authentication performance without learning
a non-linear transformation of the temporal data. For this
purpose, we obtain thresholds at 1.0% and 0.1% FARs by
computing the Euclidean distances between the raw seg-
ment pairs in the training set. These thresholds are used
to compute the TARs of the Euclidean distances between
the raw testing segment pairs. We observe that using deep
temporal features significantly improves the authentication
performance.
Keys GPS Acc Gyr Mag Lin Grv Rot0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
Modality
R
el
at
iv
e 
Co
nt
rib
ut
io
n
Figure 4: Relative contribution of each modality.
6.2. Fusion of Modalities
The performance of the individual modalities is far from
satisfactory. Given a short authentication time window, re-
lying on a single modality for authentication is, therefore,
not practical for robust and accurate authentication. In ad-
dition to poor performance of individual modalities, all the
modalities may not even be available at any given time of
the day. For instance, if the user is not using the keyboard,
we will not have access to keystroke dynamics. Therefore,
for a reliable passive authentication system, it is imperative
that we rely on multiple modalities. We evaluate the authen-
tication performance for all possible subsets of modalities
on fusing 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 modalities together (in total,
there are 247 different possible subsets). The correspond-
ing genuine and impostor scores for the modality subsets
are fused using the sum score fusion technique.
The average TARs at 0.1% FAR for all the possible sub-
sets are shown in Figure 3. Table 6 gives the top-3 best
and worst-3 performing modality subsets. It is observed
that: (1) increasing the number of fused modalities boosts
the overall authentication performance; (2) the highest ac-
curacy is achieved (99.98% TAR @ 0.1% FAR) when all
eight modalities are fused together; (3) the performance sat-
urates after fusing 5 different modalities.
6.3. Modality Contribution
The next natural question to ask is, ‘Which modal-
ity contributes the most when all the 8 modalities are
fused?’. Let M = m1, . . . ,m8 be the set of all modal-
ities. When a modality, mi, is not considered in the
fusion, the drop in overall authentication performance is
computed by (TARM − TARM ′), where M ′ contains all
the modalities except mi and TARM denotes the True
Accept Rate (%) at 0.1% FAR on fusing all modalities
in M . The contribution for modality, mi, is defined as
4Here, Key, GPS, Acc, Gyr, Mag, Lin, Grv, Rot, and All refer to
keystroke dynamics, GPS location, accelerometer, gyroscope, magnetome-
ter, linear accelerometer, gravity, rotation, and all eight modalities com-
bined, respectively.
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Figure 5: TAR at 0.1% FAR for authentication time win-
dows varying from 3 to 20 seconds.
(TARM − TARM ′) /(100 − TARM ′). We plot the rel-
ative contributions of the eight modalities in Figure 4. Note
that a high performing modality may not necessarily have a
high contribution. For instance, magnetometer has the low-
est contribution to the overall authentication performance
out of the eight modalities. Linear accelerometer, on the
other hand, has a relatively high contribution even though
it performs poorly on its own. This is likely because the
comparison scores obtained from the linear accelerometer
model is complementary to scores from other modalities.
6.4. Temporal Information
A common phenomenon in passive authentication sys-
tems involves a trade-off between the authentication time
and recognition performance. Figure 5 shows the authen-
tication performance for segment sizes of T = 3, 5, 10,
and 20 seconds. Indeed, we find that accuracy drops with
decreasing authentication time windows, likely due to lack
of information content required to successfully authenticate
the user. Therefore, the window size can be chosen depend-
ing on the application at hand. When shorter authentication
times are desired, then more number of modalities should
be considered for a secure application.
7. Conclusions
We have proposed a Siamese LSTM architecture for pas-
sive authentication of smartphone users. We collected a
dataset comprised of measurements from 30 sensor modali-
ties, for 37 smartphone users, over a time period of 15 days.
We evaluated the authentication performance under vari-
ous scenarios for 8 dominant modalities, namely keystroke
dynamics, GPS location, accelerometer, gyroscope, mag-
netometer, linear accelerometer, gravity, and rotation. We
summarize our findings as follows:
• The proposed method can passively authenticate a
smartphone user with TAR of 99.80% and 97.15% at
0.1% FAR within 5 and 3 seconds, respectively.
• Relying on a single modality for authentication is not
reliable. Fusing a subset of modalities boosts the au-
thentication accuracy. While the highest authentica-
tion accuracy is achieved when all eight modalities are
fused together (99.98% TAR @ 0.1% FAR), a subset
of 5 modalities results in comparable recognition per-
formance (99.71% TAR @ 0.1% FAR).
With the growing number of sensors found in smart-
phones, it is important to explore robust and unobtrusive
passive authentication approaches. In the future, we plan
on fusing additional smartphone modalities. In addition, we
will also design a continuous authentication scenario where
our methodology can be deployed.
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Appendix A. Data Collection
Screenshots of the Android application that was created
for passively acquiring data from the sensors are shown in
Figure 6. This application automatically turns on whenever
the smartphone boots and continuously runs in the back-
ground while passively recording sensor data. Data from
Figure 6: Screenshot of our data collection app. The user
downloads the Android app from Google Play Store and
registers themselves. The app continuously runs in the
background while passively acquiring sensor data.
the smartphone users were acquired on their own personal
devices. The five most common Android smartphones used
by the users in our dataset are given in Table 7.
Appendix B. Modalities
We list the 30 different modalities acquired in our dataset
in Table 8.
Table 7: Five most common Android smartphones used by
the users in our dataset.
Model Android Version API version
Google Pixel 3.18.70 27
OnePlus 3.18.70 26
Redmi Note 4 3.18.13 24
Nexus 5 3.04.00 23
MotoG3 3.10.49 23
Table 8: Modalities acquired in our dataset. The eight
modalities studied in this paper are highlighted in bold.
Accelerometer Smartphone’s acceleration in X, Y, Z plane
Application Usage Name of the smartphone application used
Battery Levels Percentage of battery charge left
Bluetooth Connections Bluetooth connection names around device
Brightness Levels Screen brightness level
Cell Tower Connections Cell tower names around device
File Read In/Write Out Files that were read from or written to device’s disk
Glance Gesture User glanced at their smartphone
GPS Location User’s GPS location (latitude, longitude)
Gravity Sensor Direction and magnitude of gravity
Gyroscope Gesture Rate of rotation of the device in X, Y, and Z planes
Heart Sensor User’s heart-rate beats-per-minute
Humidity Sensor Ambient air humidity percentage
Keystroke Dynamics Key hold time, finger area and finger pressure
Light Sensor Ambient light measure
Linear Acceleration Linear acceleration in X, Y, and Z planes
Magnetometer Earth’s magnetic field in X, Y, and Z planes
NFC Connections NFC connection names around device
Orientation Sensor Device’s orientation in X, Y, and Z planes
Pickup Gesture Device was picked up
Barometer Atmospheric pressure
Rotation Sensor Device’s rotation in X, Y, and Z planes
Screen Touch Sensor Touch location
Step Counter Number of steps walked
Step Detector User is walking
Temperature Sensor Ambient temperature
Tilt Detector Device is tilted
Volume Levels Level of volume set by user
Wake up Gesture Device is turned on
WiFi Connections WiFi connection names
Appendix C. Implementation Details
The proposed Siamese LSTM is implemented in Keras
2.2.45 with TensorFlow 1.9.06 backend. The LSTM is im-
plemented exactly as documented in the Keras website7.
Table 9: Training Details
Batch Size 82,240
Learning Rate 0.05
Decay 0.0
β1 0.9
β1 0.999
5https://keras.io
6https://www.tensorflow.org/
7https://keras.io/layers/recurrent/
